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ABSTRACT
In this article, it is argued that grandparents’ obligations originate from
parental obligations (i.e from the relationship they have with their children,
the parents of their grandchildren) and not from the role of grandparent per
se, and any entitlements flow from the extent to which these obligations are
met. The position defended is, therefore, that grandparents qua grandpar-
ents are not entitled to form or continue relationships with their grandchil-
dren. A continuation of grandparent-grandchildren relationships may be in
the interests of children, but the grandparental nature of the relationship is
not decisive. What counts is the extent to which relationships children have
with any adults who are not their parents are is significant to them. Some-
times, however, grandparents become parents or co-parents of their grand-
children. They then gain parental rights, and as such are as entitled, ceteris
parius, as any parent to expect their relationship with the child to continue.
The issue of grandparents’ entitlements can come to the fore when parents
separate, and grandparents are unhappy with the access they have to their
grandchildren. Grandparents’ obligations may become a particular issue
when parents die, struggle, or fail to care for their children. This article
focuses particularly on these kinds of circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Grandparents provide a significant amount care for their
grandchildren in developed counties. Some of this is care
in conjunction with their grandchild’s parents: for
instance, in Australia they provide 26% of non-parental
care.1 In the UK grandparents provide the biggest pro-
portion of the informal care used by parents,2 consist-
ently around 25%.3 Hank et al. report that across Europe
the amount of grandparental care varies between
20–40%, with the southern countries tending to provide
the higher percentages and the Scandinavian ones the
lower, but with significant outliers in both regions.4 As
well as care in conjunction with parents, some grandpar-
ents are also main carers for their grandchildren. In Aus-
tralia 16,000 grandparents are the main carers of children
0–17.5 In the USA figures vary. Livingstone & Parker6
1 Australian Bureau of Statistics. Childhood Education and Care Aus-
tralia June 2011 cat. No. 4402.0. Available at: http://www.abs.gov.au/
ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/4402.0~June+2011~Main+Features~
Main+features?OpenDocument [accessed 13 Aug 2012].
2 P. Smith et al. 2010. Childcare and Early Years Education Survey of
Parents. Official Statistics Release OSR 12/2012 Research Report DFE-
RR221 Available at: http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STR/
d001073/osr12-2012main.pdf [accessed 13 Aug 2012].
3 J. Statham. Grandparents Providing Care; a Briefing Paper. Depart-
ment for Education November 2011 Available at: http://www.
education.gov.uk/publications/RSG/EarlyYearseducationandchildcare/
Page1/CWRC-00083-2011 [accessed 13 Aug 2012].
4 I. Buber & K. Hank. Grandparents Caring for their Grandchildren:
Findings from the 2004 Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in
Europe. J Fam Issues 2009; 30(10): 53–73.
5 Australian Bureau of Statistics Family Characteristics Australia
2009-10 cat. No. 4442.0 Available: http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/
abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4442.0Main%20Features22009-10?open
document&tabname=Summary&prodno=4442.0&issue=2009-10&
num=&view [Accessed 13 Aug 2012].
6 G. Livingstone & K. Parker. Since the Start of the Great Recession,
More Children Raised by Grandparents. Pew Social and Demo-
graphic Trends 9th September 2012. Available at: http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2010/09/09/since-the-start-of-the-great-recession-
more-children-raised-by-grandparents/ [accessed 13 Aug 2012].
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suggest that 10% of children live with a grandparent and
in 41% of these families the grandparent is the main carer
for the child, and in 43% of these cases the grandparent is
the sole carer. Timmons and Dye,7 reporting on the
Census 2000, claim that 3.6% of grandparents live with
their grandchildren and 42% of these are ‘providing most
of the basic needs for children under 18’.
These figures and the range of involvement grandpar-
ents can have with their grandchildren raise at least three
ethical questions that will be addressed in this article:
1) To what extent are grandparents obliged to provide
care for their grandchildren?8 To answer this ques-
tion, we must also explore what the origins of any
proposed obligations might be.
2) Are grandparents who are not willing to be involved
in the lives of their grandchildren falling short in
their obligations?
3) Are grandparents entitled to be involved in the lives
of their grandchildren, and if so how might parental
separation affect this entitlement?
Divorce and parental separation are becoming increas-
ingly common in economically developed countries.9 This
trend has made it important to decide with whom chil-
dren should live after their parents separate. It is not just
parents who may expect access to children post-parental
separation; maternal and paternal grandparents (and
other relations of the separated parents) may also feel
entitled to have regular access to, or time with the chil-
dren. This can be difficult to achieve if, for instance,
parental separation is acrimonious, or the children are
living many miles away, or if the grandparents only learn
of the existence of the children some years after they are
born.
In the USA, where grandparents have the legal right to
petition for visitation, courts have ordered visitations
with grandparents on a par with those of parents even in
circumstances where other court orders are already in
place dividing the child’s time between parents/other
adults.10 Policies for access to children post-parental
separation in the UK,11 Canada,12 and Australia13 give
prominence to the interests of children,14 but the positive
role that grandparents can play when parents separate is
widely recognized across jurisdictions.15
FRAMING THE QUESTIONS: TWO WAYS
OF CONSIDERING THE OBLIGATIONS
AND ENTITLEMENTS OF
GRANDPARENTS
There are broadly two ways of considering the obliga-
tions and entitlements of grandparents. The first straight-
forwardly considers the welfare of the child: where
involvement with grandparents serves the welfare of the
child, then this is a reason to protect and encourage
grandparent-grandchild relationships. This formulation
is consistent with the paramountcy of the welfare of the
child in law and policies in the UK, much of the Euro-
pean Union and Australia, but says more about the rights
of children than it does about the entitlements of grand-
parents. It does not mark out grandparents for special
entitlements: the same argument could be used to
promote contact between the child and anyone else with
whom that child enjoys a beneficial relationship.
The second kind of claim is that grandparents by virtue
of being grandparents are entitled to form a relationship
with their grandchildren. This sort of claim suggests that
grandparents can, as it were, reach over the heads of
7 T. Timmons & J.L. Dye. Grandparents Living with Grandchildren:
2000 October 2003 United State Census Bureau. Available at: http://
www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-31.pdf [accessed 13 Aug 2012].
8 The European survey reported by Hank & Buber, op. cit. note 4, also
asked respondents whether they thought grandparents had a duty to
help their grandchildren’s parents with child care: the majority agreed
(regardless of whether they were providing any care) but the response
varied according to country. In Netherlands and Denmark only around
half of even those caring for grandchildren thought they had a duty to
do so.
9 For instance in the UK, 26% of children living in families live with
only one parent and 92% of lone parents are women. (Office for
National Statistics Families and Households 2001–2011 published in
January 2012. Available at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_
251357.pdf [accessed 13 Aug 2012]. In Australia 22% of children (under
the age of 15 years) were living with one parent in 2004–2006 (Austral-
ian Bureau of Statistics Australian Social Trends, 2007 4102.0 One
Parent Families. Available at: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.
nsf/0/F4B15709EC89CB1ECA25732C002079B2?opendocument#
HOW%20MANY%20ONE-PARENT%20FAMILIES%3F [accessed
24 Aug 2012]. In the USA, 32% of families with children were single-
parent families (26% headed by women and 6% headed by men) (J.
Fields. 2003. America’s Families and Living Arrangements 2003. Current
Population Reports: 20–553. US Census Bureau, Washington, DC). In
Canada in 2006, 16% of children lived in single parent families (80% of
which were headed by women) Statistics Canada Census Snapshot of
Canada – families. 2006 Available at: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-
008-x/2007006/article/10380-eng.htm [accessed 2 Aug 2012].
10 L.C. Nolan. Beyond Troxel: the Pragmatic Challenges of Grandpar-
ent Visitation Continue. Drake Law Review 2001–2002; 50: 267.
11 Children Act 1989. Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1989/41/contents [accessed 22 Aug 2012].
12 Divorce Act 1985 Sec 16(8) Available at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/
PDF/D-3.4.pdf [accessed 24 Aug 2012].
13 Family Law Amendment (Share Parental Responsibility) Act
2006. Available at: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006A00046
[accessed 4 Sept 2012].
14 Although, as James Dwyer notes, giving the interests of the child
paramountcy does not ensure that other interests will not be considered
in situations where there is little to choose between two solutions in
terms of the child’s interests. He suggests that few jurisdictions –
Canada being one – focus solely on the interests of the child in parental
disputes, for instance. J.G. Dwyer. 2006. The Relationship Rights of
Children. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15 See for instance L. Qu et al. Grandparenting and the 2006 Family
Law Reforms. Fam Matters 2011; 88: 42–50.
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parents to their grandchildren, and may even be able to
press a claim for contact when the grandchildren resist
(presuming that it is not demonstrably contrary to the
child’s interests). Such a claim would give weight to the
sense that grandparents should be the preferred carers for
children if their parents are unable to fulfil their respon-
sibilities, and it may enable grandparents who have no
existing relationship with their grandchildren to initiate
contact. This is significant since the first kind of argument
– the welfare of the child argument – does little to distin-
guish between grandparents and anyone else. A child may
form a significant relationship with any adult – family
member or otherwise – the cessation of which might be
detrimental; but (parents aside) not just any adult can
argue that it may be beneficial to a child to begin a rela-
tionship with him. If it is thought significant to the
welfare of a child to have access to, and a relationship
with, grandparents specifically, then this marks out
grandparents for special treatment. To this extent, at least
some of the sorts of claims made by grandparents appeal-
ing to the welfare of the child include an assumption that
as grandparents they have special entitlements viz their
grandchildren. Whilst claims by grandparents will rarely
trump the welfare claims of children, they may under-
mine the authority of parents.16,17
One challenge to a strong presumption of this kind is
that not all grandparents want the responsibilities that
may accompany it. If the grandparent-grandchild rela-
tionship warrants protection (akin to that of the
parent-child relationship) then the accompanying respon-
sibilities attach to all grandparents, just as they do to
parents. Accordingly, just as parents are open to criticism
for failing to step up to the plate of parental responsibil-
ity, so would grandparents be criticizable if they failed to
be sufficiently ‘grandparent-like’.18
This article will attempt to identify the source of grand-
parents’ obligations, to their grandchildren. It will reject
the view that genetic relatedness gives rise to grandpar-
ental obligations and suggest instead that the parent-
child relationship is the origin of grandparents’
obligations.19 Finally, it will consider what entitlements
and obligations grandparents might have to continue
relationships with their grandchildren.
GENETIC RELATEDNESS
Policy and law in many countries gives special weight to
genetic relatedness in assigning parental obligations (and
rights). This is so even in countries that protect non-
genetic family relationships (those arising, for instance,
from adoption, remarriage, or conception using donated
gametes). For instance, the European Convention on
Human Rights Article 8 protects family life, and
although the quality of the relationship with the child is
vital to cases brought under the Convention, it seems
clear that whilst blood ties (i.e. genetic relatedness) are
not necessary to establish family ties, they may be suffi-
cient, especially in regard to wider family.20 The conven-
tions tend to use general terms like ‘family relations’,
‘family’ and even ‘parent’ without defining what these
mean. In view of this, valuing specifically genetic ties is as
much a social norm as it is something required by inter-
national agreements, and it is open to question whether
genetic relationships ought to be regarded as significant
or not.
Among philosophers genetic relatedness has not
proved to be a convincing basis for defining parenthood
or the source of parental responsibilities. The debate
about the origins of parental responsibility extends over a
vast literature, of which only a brief outline can be pro-
vided here. Daniel Callahan, for example sought to
defend ‘the moral seriousness of biological [genetic]
fatherhood’ as a ‘natural bond [that] cannot be abrogated
16 Much of the debate in the USA, especially post-Troxel is over
whether grandparent visitation undermines parental authority / paren-
tal or family autonomy: ‘the Troxel Court recognized and affirmed a
parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of a child, absent a
showing of unfitness or failure to protect the child’s welfare.’ D.R.
Victor & K.L. Middleditch. Grandparents Visitation: A Survey of
History, Jurisprudence, and Legislative Trends across the United States
in the Past Decade. J Amer Acad Mat Law 2009; 22: 391. See also, for
example, L.C. Nolan. Honor thy Father and thy Mother: But Court-
ordered Visitation in the Intact Family? BYU J Pub L 1993–1994; 8: 51;
T. Neilson &R. Bucaria. Grandparent Custody Disputes and Visitation
Rights: Balancing the Interests of the Child, Parents, and Grandparents
Utah L Rev 2009: 569.
17 Note that this is not a claim about some right to become a grandpar-
ent: clearly parents cannot insist that their children become parents in
order that they can have a relationship with the resulting grandchildren.
18 No jurisdictions force parental responsibilities (beyond the financial)
on unwilling parents, even if meaningful contact is in the interest of the
child, (See Dwyer, op. cit. note 14) so it seems unlikely that even those
jurisdictions where grandparents have, for example visitation rights,
would require unwilling grandparents to be regularly visited by a grand-
child even if this was in the child’s interests. Nonetheless, the legal
position here is different from the moral one: it is possible to call
attention to moral failure without necessarily implying that good behav-
iour should be compelled.
19 I am not be suggesting that this is the only origin of obligations that
people who are grandparents may have. For example, if I undertake to
care for my daughter’s children whilst she is working away from home
I am obliged to do so. But the origin of this obligation is not that she is
my daughter, but rather that I voluntarily undertook to do so. I am also
obliged to care for her children if, on hearing their cries of distress, I
discover that she has left them at home alone, but again, the origin for
this obligation is that they are vulnerable and in need of care. The focus
of this article is the origins of obligations that are thought to arise from
being a grandparent, not those that arise in other ways.
20 See A. Bainham. 2003. Contact as a Right and Obligation. In A.
Bainham, B. Lindley, M. Richards & L. Trinder, eds. Children and their
Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare. Oxford: Hart Publishing, ch.5.
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or put aside’21 so that even post-adoption a biological
father retains responsibility for his child should that
adoption fail. But his argument rests, in fact, not on
biology but the contention that actions voluntarily22
undertaken caused the child to exist and create obliga-
tions for as long as the child exists. The child, once he
exists, is in need of care and nurture, and it is the respon-
sibility of those who voluntarily caused him to exist to
supply these things. Callahan’s argument does not
support obligations flowing from genetic relatedness per
se but rather genetic relatedness is evidence of voluntarily
causing the needy child to exist. Voluntarily causing is
thus the critical notion.
Rivka Weinberg proposes something similar, arguing
that the risk that gametes, if combined, will produce a
needy child imposes serious responsibilities.23 For reasons
we will return to, Weinberg also argues that these respon-
sibilities cannot be transferred. Kolers and Bayne24
roundly reject the claim that genetic relatedness is neces-
sary and sufficient for parenthood, though they accept –
by proposing a pluralistic approach25 – that it may be
sufficient, and agree that looking for the origin or cause
of a child is a relevant factor in determining who bears
responsibility for her. Their pluralistic account includes
different sorts of cause, including intention. The pertinent
question for this article is whether, even if a causal
(genetic) chain of some kind is at least sufficient to
explain parental responsibility, it can also be used to
explain grandparental responsibility.
Parents are not generally regarded as being responsible
for the voluntary actions of their (adult) children;26 and
having a child cannot by itself create a risk that vulner-
able children will be brought into being who, but for the
reproductive choices of their grandparents, would not
have existed. If this is kind of causal chain were sufficient
to generate obligation, why stop at grandparents rather
than great grandparents and so forth back through time?
Rather than establishing a basis for responsibility, this
appeal to genetic relatedness is an invitation to shuffle off
responsibility, since everyone can argue that they didn’t
choose to be born. Moreover, according to the voluntary
cause argument, it is the vulnerabilities of children as
minors that give rise, to parental obligations. This sug-
gests that the voluntary cause argument only explains
parental obligation to their minor (vulnerable and needy)
children and not their adult ones.27 Indeed, the literature
on parenthood tends to be confined to the origins of
parental responsibilities, and it only addresses the point
at which parental responsibilities may end in terms of
whether these responsibilities can be meaningfully trans-
ferred early in a child’s existence (for example by discuss-
ing surrogacy, gamete donation or adoption). There is
comparative silence on the issue of what responsibilities
parents might have towards their adult children, and we
will be returning to this issue in the next section.
Callahan considers that the responsibilities of parent-
hood are such that they can never be transferred: ‘once a
father, always a father’.28 But not all those who give
weight to genetic relatedness when defining parental
responsibility agree with him. David Benatar, for
instance, argues that ‘people have a presumptive respon-
sibility for rearing children who result from their
gametes’ because they ‘bear responsibility for their repro-
ductive conduct’ insofar as this is an expression of their
reproductive autonomy.29 Nonetheless, he accepts that
parental responsibilities can be transferred, but they must
be transferred responsibly not lightly. For the purposes of
defining grandparenthood, it may be sufficient to accept
that parental responsibilities clearly can be transferred
(after all, adoptive parents without doubt acquire paren-
tal responsibility) even if we leave aside the question of
whether they ought ever to be. Granted it is possible to
transfer parental responsibility i.e. for a parent to cease to
be a parent, it is not clear how that person’s parents can,
ceteris paribus,30 claim to be grandparents with grandpa-
rental rights or obligations.
On the contrary, given that parental responsibility has
been transferred, the proper conclusion is that the parents
of the parents by adoption become the grandparents of
an adopted child. Assuming that gamete donation repre-
sents a similar transfer of responsibility, and given that
no relationship is likely to have formed between the
gamete donor’s parents and the child, the grandparents of
21 D. Callahan. 1996. Bioethics and Fatherhood. In L. May, R. Strik-
werda & P.D. Hopkins, eds. Rethinking Masculinity: Philosophical
Explorations in the Light of Feminism. 2nd Edn. Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc: 163.
22 The is also debate over what counts as voluntary and the impact of
deception (e.g. sperm banditry in relation to sperm) on voluntary
action.
23 R. Weinberg. The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation. Bioethics
2008; 22(3): 166–178.
24 A. Kolers & T. Bayne. ‘Are You MyMummy?’ On the Genetic Basis
of Parenthood. J Appl Philos 2001; 18(3): 273–285.
25 T. Bayne & A. Kolers. Towards a pluralistic account of parenthood.
Bioethics 2003; 17(3): 221–242.
26 For the purposes of this article I will leave aside the question of
whether parents are responsible for children that result from pregnan-
cies of minor children. Even if such parents are then responsible for their
grandchildren, this is affects only a subset of grandparents and not is an
argument that is applicable to grandparents generally.
27 Save perhaps those cases where the adults have been vulnerable from
birth or since they were minors. Here the question might be whether this
burden is solely laid on the shoulders of parents but should be shared by
the state.
28 Callahan, op. cit. note 21, p. 163 – but this could be generalized to
once a parent (as evidenced by genetic related through the VC argu-
ment) always a parent
29 D. Benatar. The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing into Being. J Appl
Philos 1999; 16(2): 174.
30 Things might not be equal if they already have a substantial
relationship with child who is capable of understanding meaningful
relationships.
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the resulting children will once again be the parents of the
gamete recipients, not the parents of the gamete donor.
Indeed, to argue otherwise in either the case of adoption
or gamete donation undermines the legitimacy of the
parents in both cases.
Now, it might be argued that when a parent transfers
parental responsibility they do not cease to be a parent;
they just cease to have parental responsibility. Accord-
ingly, the genetic grandparents remain grandparents in
some sense. In what sense such a label is morally signifi-
cant or gives rise to responsibilities is not clear, however.
If terms like ‘parent’ or ‘grandparent’ merely describe
genetic connections rather than ascribing a role, they are
devoid of normative content. A genetic family tree does
nothing to explain why those on it might have special
obligations or entitlements in relation to the children at
the tip of its branches. Further argument is needed to
explain why being genetically related to a greater rather
than lesser degree generates obligations, especially where
the elements of voluntary cause are clearly not applicable
(which applies as much to aunts, cousins or other
members of the wider family as it does to grandparents).
In conclusion, genetic relatedness as the source of
parental responsibilities has intuitive appeal, but scratch
the surface and factors such as voluntarily causing or
risk-taking are required to explain parental responsibili-
ties and obligations. These factors are not operative in the
case of grandparents, and so do not explain why grand-
parents might have obligations to grandchildren. If
grandparents do have obligations, some alternative
explanation for them needs to be found.
GRANDPARENTING AS AN EXTENSION
OF PARENTING
Adoption, using donated gametes to create children, step-
parenting and blended families all challenge the signifi-
cance of genetic ties and voluntary cause as the
explanation for familial obligation. Instead of genes,
actions – commitment to and performance of parental
responsibilities generated by a child’s needs – may confer
parental status, and in turn parental rights.31 Parental
love is also a significant element of parenting. Weinberg
considers that loving a child is a parental obligation and
it is for this reason that parental responsibilities cannot
be transferred: someone cannot be asked to love another
in one’s place.32 Whilst I agree with her that love is a vital
component of parenting, I struggle with the notion that
one can be obligated to love another, since it is far from
obvious that love is a product of the will. Again, it is clear
that parents who adopt children or gain them by means
of gamete donation can in fact love them as deeply as any
other parent. So, perhaps what we should conclude is not
that parental responsibility cannot be transferred, but
rather that it ought not to be; that with rare exceptions,33
the willing transfer of parental responsibility is a failure
of parenting. We may go further and say that for parents
the willing transfer of parental responsibility is normally
unconscionable because they love their children. And we
might also say that parental love and the fulfilment of
parental responsibilities for a needy child defines one as a
parent.
Parental responsibility is not necessarily limited to the
period before legal majority. In short, parenting lasts as
long as one is able to continue. One reason that parenting
does not end at legal majority is that parents do not stop
loving their children just because they have reached
adulthood. Parental love and responsibility take different
forms over the child’s life-time according to the child’s
changing needs. This means that although parents are not
responsible for the consequences of their children’s
achievements and failures, they may have continuing
obligations to help when the consequences are adverse or
burdensome.
We can now begin to see the source of grandparental
obligations in their own parental obligations. Parents
love their children, even when those children are adults
and have children themselves. Indeed, it is when their
children have children that they may need assistance.
Childrearing is hard work, sometimes relentlessly hard
work, which often has to be performed alongside paid
work. Here, then, are two reasons why grandparents
might be obliged to become involved in the lives of their
grandchildren; the burdensome nature of childcare for
the grandchildren’s parents, and the significance of the
grandchildren to their parents. Let us take the latter first.
The nature of parental love is such that the interests of
the parents and child become intertwined and ‘selflessness
and self-interest coincide’.34 That which is significant to
children, matters to their parents.35 In the case of grand-
parents their children’s children ought to be important to
them just because they are important to their children.
Simply put, the person who unreasonably refuses to show
any interest in her grandchildren – even though they are
31 See, e.g. Chapter 3 of Adam Swift and Harry Brighouse’s forthcom-
ing book on family values – earlier ideas for which can be found in H.
Brighouse & A. Swift. Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family.
Ethics 2006; 117(1): 80–108.
32 Weinberg, op. cit. note 23, p. 174.
33 I agree withWeinberg that one good example of this might be ‘I loved
you so much that I released you to a family more capable of caring for
you’ motivation for adoption. Ibid:175.
34 H. Frankfurt. 2004. The Reasons of Love. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press: 62.
35 Of course, what matters to one’s children might be repugnant to their
parents. The view that parents should engage with that which matters
deeply to their children does not necessary require parents to embrace
views and practices that their children hold dear: one might take them
seriously by engaging in serious and respectful disagreement.
313 Heather Draper
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
clearly important to her child – is failing to be a good
parent rather than failing to be a good grandparent.
Equally, the person who unreasonably interferes in the
relationship between her daughter and her daughter’s
child is failing to be a good parent because she is med-
dling in her daughter’s affairs rather than supporting her.
The extent to which grandparents are involved in the lives
of their grandchildren will depend on the extent to which
they are involved in the lives of their children. This may in
part be reflected in how they help to shoulder the burden
of childrearing.
The obligation to help with the burdens of childrearing
will depend on a variety of factors ranging from the
extent to which it is a burden to the parents (which may
depend on their own means and dispositions) to the
extent to which the grandparents are themselves able to
help. It will also include the costs to the grandparent of
helping: some grandparents want nothing more than to
be involved in the lives of their grandchildren; for others,
being released from their own childcare responsibilities is
an opportunity to achieve the ambitions that were incom-
patible with those responsibilities. The costs for the latter
grandparents may be sufficiently weighty to outweigh the
obligation to help as the obligation to meet one’s chil-
dren’s needs lessens as one’s children mature and are able
to meet their own needs. As a child becomes less vulner-
able and in need of nurture, the obligation to prioritize
her needs lessens in the day-to-day life of the parent, even
though it remains significant. It is not unreasonable,
therefore, for parents to prioritize their own life plans
ahead of the day-to-day plans of their adult children, and
this may include, for example, not taking on full-time
day-care responsibilities for grandchildren, even though
this would help their parents. On the other hand, in an
emergency or in the case of other forms of extreme need,
the needs of adult children sometimes have to take prior-
ity. It may be unreasonable to demand that a grandpar-
ent relocates away from her own job and social network
to care for grandchildren, and equally unreasonable to
refuse an extended visit periodically, or in an emergency,
or to communicate with grandchildren at a distance if this
matters to the adult child. On the other hand, constant
unwelcome interference may be a continuation of a
pattern of poor parenting, whereas unsolicited advice to
prevent a bad outcome might be an unpopular but nec-
essary part of parenting an older child, even an adult one.
But these judgements are similar to those that are rou-
tinely left to parents and will be handled differently by
different parents with different degrees of generosity and
success.
We are now in a position to answer two of the three
questions posed at the start of this article, namely
whether grandparents have an obligation to provide care
for their grandchildren and whether those who do not are
failing in this obligation. The case for a prima facie obli-
gation has been made. The extent to which the failure to
meet this obligation is a failure depends largely on the
costs to the grandparent of meeting the obligation rela-
tive to the circumstances of the parent. This prima facie
obligation is, however, a parental obligation not a grand-
parental obligation. It offers an explanation for the
origins of grandparents’ obligations but may not give full
account of the obligations in play.
Relationships formed with grandchildren can generate
direct obligations to the grandchildren themselves rather
than their parents. But it is not clear that what provides
the normative element here is a distinctively grandparent-
grandchild relationship. A general argument can be made
for the wrongness of giving children false expectations, or
breaking promises, or being unreliable and so forth. Chil-
dren are especially vulnerable as they are likely to be
more trusting and less canny than adults, and this height-
ens the general obligation to be truthful, keep promises
and so forth. Any adult in an especially close relationship
with a child will have similar obligations of this kind.
These are the obligations of adults to children they inter-
act with and care about. They are not distinctively
the obligations of family members, and this being so,
there may be no distinctively grandparental obligations
at all, but only caring adult obligations discharged by
grandparents.
GRANDPARENTS WHO ARE ALSO
PARENTS OF GRANDCHILDREN
Grandparents may be thought to have increased obliga-
tions to care for their grandchildren if their parents are
unable (perhaps due to death or imprisonment) or unwill-
ing to discharge their parental obligations to their
children.
When a parent of a minor dies, the surviving grand-
parent may want to ensure that their own child’s hopes
for and obligations to the grandchild are fulfilled. In this
respect, becoming a parent is unlike other life-interests
such as a career or sporting ambition that dies with the
person. The product of this life-interest is a needy child
who is, if anything, needier as a result of his parent’s
death. The strength of the obligations here may depend
on the circumstances, for example, on whether the child
has another living and engaged parent. If not, although
the grandparent’s sense of obligation may be acute, what
happens next must also be decided by the welfare of the
child and what best meets his needs. Depending on the
grandparents’ own circumstances these may or may not
be met by taking the child into their home and rearing
him. If the grandchild has another competent parent, the
grandparents may still be obliged to shoulder some of the
burden and all parties may benefit from the continuation
good grandparent/grandchild relationships and solicited
Grandparents’ Entitlements and Obligations 314
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
help with the burdens of child-rearing. There may also be
parents of the remaining parent who should share this
burden. Arguably, the more people there are who ought
to share the burden, the less the burden is and therefore
the greater the obligation to do one’s share, for as the
weight of the burden decreases the more difficult it is to
justify opting out of shouldering it.
In the case where parents are struggling or unwilling
(as opposed to unable) to fulfil their parental responsi-
bilities, the grandparents may feel that they ought to
fulfil them in their place. Leaving to one side issues of
reputation or family name and honour, this might be
akin to parents wanting to clear an adult child’s debts
or offer compensation for some harm their adult child
has caused. However, as parents have no obligation to
make good their adult child’s wrongdoing, contribution
beyond that owed by their parental obligations would
be supererogatory. Again, the interests of the child
should be decisive in determining the extent to which
the grandparent should take over a childrearing role. In
the USA, where the most data seems to be have been
collected, the record of grandparents as sole carers is
not one of overwhelming success. The grandchildren are
disproportionately likely to live in poverty, suffer
mental illness, experience behavioural problems and
contract sexually transmitted disease, for instance.36
This may, however, be yet more evidence of the effect of
the poverty of older people being combined with child
poverty,37 and other general disadvantages felt by chil-
dren born into chaotic families, rather than evidence
that grandparents do a disproportionately poor job of
bringing up their grandchildren. Moreover, grandpar-
ents may do a better job of childrearing even in these
circumstances than any of the available alternatives.
As these examples illustrate, grandparents’ contribu-
tion to childcare may assume the proportions of a full-
scale parental contribution. In these cases, grandparents
might justifiably regard themselves as sole parents or
co-parents, with all the accompanying rights of parents.
This is especially pertinent to the third question raised in
the introduction, whether grandparents can be entitled to
continued relationships with their grandchildren.
When considering what entitlements grandparents
might have in relation to their grandchildren, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between substantial care given to help
parents of the kind also given by people who are not
relations of the children, and care that replaces or sub-
stitutes for parental care. Many parents are unable to
provide full time care for their young children (especially
parents who need to take paid employment) and the
majority of children spend substantial amounts of their
day during term time in school, where besides being
obliged to provide education, the school is obliged to
provide personal care in proportion to the age and cir-
cumstances of the child. This care may be considerable in
boarding schools and summer camps, for example. Sig-
nificant relationships may develop between children and
their childminders, nannies, au pairs, teachers, school
staff (teachers, counsellors and matrons) but they are not
regarded as so significant that any of the above are enti-
tled (or obliged) to continue with such relationships
when they are brought to an end either through circum-
stance or parental will. Sometimes the grandparental
contribution is no greater than, and deserves no more
recognition than, that of the responsible but unrelated
adult.
On the other hand, where grandparents provide sole
care over an extended period and in the absence of paren-
tal input, fulfilling the responsibilities of parenthood,
then grandparents should be afforded the associated
rights of parenthood, including ceteris parius the right to
continue to rear their child. But this is a parental right,
not a grandparental right. In these circumstances, grand-
parents have a special claim because they have become
parents and their claims should be considered on a par
with anyone else who also claims to be the child’s parent,
with the interests of the child being the decisive factor in
both formal and informal dispute resolution.
Grandparent-parents face a particular personal
dilemma if they come into conflict with co-parents who
are their children. Parenting, even in the case of adult
children, remains associated with protecting and promot-
ing the interests of the child. It might therefore be
assumed that grandparents are generally obliged not to
contest custody of grandchildren where the other party to
the conflict is their own child. The potential dilemma for
the grandparent-parent is not, however, between their
obligations to their child and their grandchild, but their
competing obligation to their two children, the latter of
whom is also a grandchild. This kind of conflict is famil-
iar to all those who are the parent of more than one child,
and it is not obvious that such tensions must always be
resolved in favour of the oldest, most vocal and least
vulnerable child. Shared-care and co-operative
co-parenting may be the most appropriate outcome.
36 O.W. Edwards & A.P. Daire. School Age Children Raised by
their Grandparents: Problems and Solutions. J Instr Psych 2006;
33(2). Available at: http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Journal-
Instructional-Psychology/148367616.html [accessed 4 Sept 2012]; G.C.
Smith & P.A. Palmieri. Risk of Psychological Difficulties of Children
Raised by Custodial Grandparents. Psychiat Serv 2007; 58(10): 1303–
1310.
37 J. Grigg. 2009. For Grandparents Plus and EHFC The Poor Rela-
tion: Grandparental Care where Older People’s Poverty and Child
Poverty Meet. Grandparents Plus: London. Available at: http://
www.grandparentsplus.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/The-Poor-
Relation-interim-report.pdf [accessed 4 Sept 2012]; L.A Baker, M.
Silverstein & N.M. Putney. Grandparents Raising Grandchildren in the
United States: Changing Family Forms, Stagnant Social Policies. J Soc
Soc Pol 2008; 7: 53–69. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2888319/ [accessed 4 Sept 2012 ].
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Grandparental obligations arise from parental obliga-
tions. Some grandparents in fulfilling their obligations to
the parents of grandchildren develop strong, independent
relationships with their grandchildren. But it is not
obvious that these relationships are significant because
they are made with grandparents. Children can and do
develop significant relationships with adults who are not
related to them. The significance of the relationship to the
child is more pertinent to determining whether or not the
relationship warrants protection. In this respect, that a
child has a relationship with a grandparent is not suffi-
cient to regard that relationship as a special one.
There is evidence that grandparents can enhance the
welfare of their grandchildren.38 In order for grandchil-
dren to benefit from such relationships, they have to be
built up over time. Such relationships can be disrupted
when parents separate. Willing grandparents may find it
difficult to establish and maintain beneficial relationships
with their grandchildren, and this may be to the detri-
ment of all concerned. Equally, children with separated
parents may already have their time and energies divided
between two different households and families, and,
as they grow older, also have additional competing
demands on their times from friends and other social
networks. This may make it difficult for them to find time
to attend to the multitude of relationships in their differ-
ent wider families, including those with grandparents.39
These competing factors ought to be given due consid-
eration by those seeking greater access to these children,
especially those purporting to be representing a child’s
interests.
Visitation rights in the USA resulted from petitioning
by grandparent lobby groups. The success of the petitions
no doubt had something to do with the power of the
‘grey’ vote, but it is also connected to some intuitive sense
that grandparents have a special status in the lives of their
grandchildren that has gone unchallenged. This intuition
is not confined to the USA. In the UK, for example, the
Centre for Social Justice concluded that:
. . . grandparents seeking contact [with their grandchil-
dren] should not be placed in the same legal position as
other extended family members or stepparents to the
family who need leave to apply to the court.40
But our intuitions can be mistaken. Following the
Family Justice Review,41 the UK government decided
that grandparents should continue to apply for leave of
court to petition for access.42 In Australia, the Family
Law Amendment (Share Parental Responsibility) Act
2006 (Cth) states that ‘children have the right to spend
time on a regular basis with, and communicate with, both
parents and other people significant to their care, welfare
and development (such as grandparents and other rela-
tives). [s60B(2)(b)]. In both Australia and the UK, then,
legislators have resolved the question of grandparental
access by acknowledging that grandparents may form
special relationships without assuming that they are
special because they are made with grandparents.
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